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Abstract 
 
I analyze the effect of inequality on economic growth in Latin America, 
where inequality is measured as the area of family farms as a percentage of 
the total area of agricultural holdings. Using data from 18 Latin American 
countries between 1960 and 2004, I find that inequality has a nonlinear 
effect on economic growth. Overall, for the countries included in this 
analysis, the share of family farms has a positive significant effect on 
economic growth. These findings are robust to controlling for several 
factors, using a different indicator of inequality (land Gini), and addressing 
for endogeneity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Many researchers have attempted to determine the effects of inequality on economic 
growth. While Kuznets (1955) stated that an increase in inequality in the early stages of 
development was a pattern in developed countries (DCs), others have argued that inequality is 
detrimental to growth (Easterly, 2007). Inequality in opportunities is relevant to economic 
development since the well-being of society is not only considered a function of income, but also 
a function of the access that individuals have to education, health, and other services (Sen, 2000). 
Therefore, the analysis of the persistence and the effects of inequality in less developed countries 
(LDCs) is important for policymakers.    
 Latin America is the second most unequal region of the world (World Bank, 2006) and 
income inequality increased during the 1990s (Sáinz, 2006). The average Gini coefficient in the 
region between 2000 and 2005 was 54.2, which is considerably higher than the Gini coefficients 
of a sample of five DCs.1 In Latin America, between 2000 and 2005, the richest tenth of the 
population received on average more than 42 percent of the total income, while the poorest 10 
percent received between 0.25 and 1.46 percent. On the other hand, in DCs, such as the United 
States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, and Italy, the richest tenth received on average 
between 22 and 30 percent, while the poorest received between 1.80 and 4 percent (Table 1).2  
 Table 1 here 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) argue that inequality in Latin America can be explained 
by initial factor endowments, such as soil, climate, and the density of native population. Because 
Latin American countries have soils and climates suitable for the production of crops that require 
economies of scale and are labor intensive, there was an agricultural organization based on 
concentrated ownership of land in the colonial period. This early inequality led to the 
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establishment of institutions that were detrimental to growth. Hence, the unequal distribution of 
assets could be an important factor that keeps this region underdeveloped. 
 Recently, Easterly (2007) tested the Engerman and Sokoloff (ES) hypothesis by 
analyzing the effects of inequality on growth. He uses an instrument for income inequality that is 
related to initial factor endowments: the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat relative to 
that for growing sugarcane. He shows that this instrument is correlated with the share of family 
farms, where suitability to grow wheat is associated with a more equal distribution of resources. 
Easterly finds support for the ES hypothesis by showing that inequality has a negative effect on 
economic growth, schooling, and institutions.3 
 Most studies on the effect of inequality on growth are cross-sectional or use inconsistent 
measures of inequality, and it is easy to see why. To obtain a measure of inequality that is 
available over time for a large set of LDCs is difficult. For Latin American countries, Gini 
coefficients on income and land distribution are not available consistently, and taking a panel 
approach to analyze the effects of inequality on growth in the region with these measures would 
be impossible.4 Nonetheless, to determine the effects of inequality on growth in a panel 
framework, the area of family farms as a percentage of total area of agricultural holdings can be 
used.  
 In this paper, I analyze the effects of inequality on economic growth in a panel of 18 
Latin American countries from 1960 to 2004.5 I test the ES hypothesis by using a measure of 
inequality that is related to resource distribution, the area of family farms as a percentage of the 
total area of agricultural holdings. The share of family farms is an important measure of 
inequality because access to land has been associated with the degree to which people participate 
in the economic and political systems. Even after rapid urbanization, access to land is an 
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important determinant of wealth and social mobility in Latin America (Torche and Spilerman, 
2006). Individuals who have access to land are also more likely to participate in the political 
process and receive an education.6 
 I find that equality has nonlinear effect on growth, where the effect of the share of family 
farms on growth is increasing up to a certain level, once this level is reached the effect of an 
increase in the family farms share on growth is decreasing. This finding is robust after 
controlling for different factors (urbanization, technology and climate), and using an alternative 
measure of resource inequality (land Gini). Based on the family farm shares in 1998, all the 
countries in this analysis would benefit by increases in the share of family farms since they have 
family farm shares at which the effect of family farms on growth is increasing. The positive 
effect of equality on growth is robust to addressing for endogeneity of inequality.  
 This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the effects of 
inequality on growth and discusses the importance of analyzing the effects of resource 
distribution on economic growth in Latin America; Section 3 presents the methodology; Sections 
4 and 5 discuss the results and the robustness tests; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
(a) The effect of inequality on growth 
There are several theoretical models which explain why inequality may negatively affect 
economic growth. First, the imperfect capital market model states that, with high inequality, it 
will be difficult for poor people to invest in physical and human capital. In a society where 
wealth is not equally distributed, the poor face credit constraints, and this leads to a vicious cycle 
of low productivity and economic growth (Banerjee and Newman, 1991; Galor and Zeira, 1993). 
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Second, in the political economy framework, the model of redistribution states that as inequality 
increases the median voter will be more likely to vote for redistributive policies. These policies 
deter economic growth since they discourage investment (Benabou, 1996; 2000). Third, in the 
social conflict model, high inequality is associated with lower economic growth because it 
precedes social unrest and political instability. Economic growth in this model is hampered by 
inequality because instability discourages investment (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996). Fourth, 
inequality can have a negative effect on growth through its effect on institutions. Highly unequal 
societies may be unable to achieve democracy since the distribution of resources determines the 
distribution of political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Vanhanen, 2003a). Furthermore, 
in highly unequal societies, there are institutions that promote the persistence of inequality and 
hamper economic growth in the long run (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). 
There is empirical support for the idea that inequality negatively affects growth. In a 
sample of 64 countries, Deininger and Squire (1998) find evidence in favor of the imperfect 
capital model. Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) find empirical 
support for the political economy model of redistribution, both in a broad sample of 46 countries 
and in one restricted to DCs. Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Rodrick (1999) show that inequality 
decreases growth through its effects on instability using cross-sectional samples. Vanhanen 
(2003a) presents empirical support for his resource distribution theory of democratization, where 
the distribution of resources determines the distribution of political power. He finds, in an 
analysis that includes 170 countries, that the distribution of resources determined the average 
level of democracy between 1999 and 2001. Keefer and Knack (2002) and Easterly et al. (2006) 
show empirically that high inequality leads to institutions that deter growth, such as weak 
property rights and low governance.7  
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    On the other hand, there is also theoretical and empirical work showing that inequality 
is beneficial to growth and supporting the Kuznets’ (1955) inverse U shaped relationship 
between inequality and growth.8 Barro (2000) argues that the imperfect capital market model can 
explain the positive effect of inequality on growth. In equally distributed societies, there are low 
levels of investment because firms tend to be small. Small firms have less incentive to invest 
since they face low returns on investment. Furthermore, since the rich will have less incentive to 
save in an environment with less redistribution, lower levels of inequality are associated with 
lower savings rates. Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), and Forbes (2000) show empirically 
that inequality leads to higher economic growth. Alternatively, Barro (2000) finds that inequality 
has a positive effect on growth only in rich countries; in poor countries increases in inequality 
produce a negative effect on growth. Nonetheless, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) challenge previous 
empirical and theoretical work by arguing that inequality has a nonlinear effect on economic 
growth. According to them, the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth, measurement bias, and 
endogeneity of inequality explain why there are different empirical results.  
 There is no general consensus on the effect of inequality on growth and measurement 
issues have been blamed for that. Obtaining a measure of inequality that is consistent through 
time and that is comparable across countries is difficult. Because Gini coefficients of income 
distribution are usually estimated from different surveys that cover different populations and 
different sources of income (income, earnings, consumption, or expenditure), using them in the 
analysis of the effects of inequality on growth can be problematic.9 In fact, Atkinson and 
Brandolini (2001) show, using a sample of DCs, how the distribution of income differs from one 
source to another and how this leads to misleading empirical results in the analysis of the effects 
of inequality on growth.10 In addition, Perry et al. (2006) argue that Gini coefficients based on 
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income surveys are biased since surveys reflect short term income but not lifetime income. 
 In the analysis of the effects of inequality on growth, an alternative approach is to use a 
measure of inequality that is related to resource distribution. Since the income of individuals 
depends significantly on the access to the means of production, we could use a measure related 
to the access that individuals have to land to quantify inequality. According to Easterly (2007) an 
indicator like this will reflect structural inequality, which has been universally associated with 
underdevelopment.   
(b) Resource distribution in Latin America 
 Resource distribution is a key determinant of long run economic growth according to the 
ES hypothesis (2002). Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) posited that factor endowments 
determined the distribution of resources in the colonial period in Latin America. In highly 
unequal environments, institutions that precluded the participation of a large fraction of the 
population in the economic and political systems and promoted the persistence of inequality 
were created. On the other hand, in more equally distributed societies, the institutions established 
allowed the majority of the population to take advantage of economic opportunities and to 
participate in the political process. According to Engerman and Sokoloff (2006a, p.74) 
“economic institutions shape opportunities”, and these opportunities were important for the early 
industrialization process of Latin American countries. In the ES hypothesis, levels of inequality 
determined the type of economic institutions, and consequently the prospects of long run 
economic growth.     
 A number of empirical and theoretical analyses attempted to test the ES hypothesis. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Acemoglu (2007) argue that in unequal environments, there 
is more likely to be an oligarchic political system that does not allow for democratization. Rajan 
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and Zingales (2006) argue that within an oligarchic system there are institutions that promote the 
persistence of inequality and barriers to entering the market and the political process.11 To 
account for resource distribution in the analysis of the effects of inequality on growth, some have 
used the Gini coefficient of land distribution (Birdsall and Londono, 1997; Deininger and Squire, 
1998; Easterly, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2006b). These analyses find that inequitable 
ownership of land depresses growth through its effect on the political environment, institutions, 
investment, and schooling.  
 An alternative measure of inequality related to resource distribution is the area of family 
farms as a percentage of the total area of agricultural holdings. This measure has been associated 
with the distribution of income in North America and Latin America (Przeworski and Curvale, 
2008).12 Easterly (2007) shows, for a large sample of countries, that the share of family farms in 
early periods has a significant negative effect on the average of the income share of the top 
quintile from 1960 to 1998. Because the control of land has been unequally distributed in Latin 
American since the colonial period (Birdsall and Londono, 1997; Morley, 2001; Justino et al. 
2003; Perry et al. 2006; Torche and Spilerman, 2006), the share of family farms seems a 
reasonable measure of inequality. 
 Few have attempted to test the effect of inequality on growth in Latin America. De 
Gregorio (1992), in a growth equation for 12 Latin American countries from 1950 to 1985, finds 
that income inequality has no significant effect on growth. De Gregorio and Lee (2004), using a 
sample period from 1970 to 2000, find that income inequality has no significant effect on 
growth, but that it has a significant negative effect on schooling and institutional quality and a 
positive effect on fertility.13 To measure inequality these analyses use the share of income 
received by the highest and lowest 20 percent (De Gregorio, 1992) and the income Gini 
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coefficient (De Gregorio and Lee, 2004). While both analyses use a panel framework, De 
Gregorio’s (1992) measure of inequality is time invariant. Furthermore, there are measurement 
issues related to the measure of inequality used by De Gregorio and Lee (2004). My paper differs 
from these previous analyses by using the share of family farms, which is consistently available 
for Latin American countries and for a larger sample period that accounts for current changes in 
economic growth and inequality. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 The countries included in this analysis are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. I construct 10 year averages from 
1960 to 1999, except for the last observation which is only a five year average from 2000 to 
2004. There are 5 observations per country for a total of 90 observations.  
 I use is the share of family farms constructed by Vanhanen (2003b) to measure equality. 
Vanhanen (2003a) defines a family farm as any farm that employs no more than four people, 
including family members. The benefit of using the family farms share is that it accounts for 
“holdings that are mainly cultivated by the holder family itself and are owned by the cultivator 
family or held in ownerlike possession” (Vanhanen, 2003a, p. 84). The share of family farms 
used as a measure of equality helps us to avoid the problem of not including in our measure those 
individuals who have control of land but may not have legal ownership, have communal 
ownership, or tenancy rights. According to Vanhanen (2003a) those individuals should be 
considered socially and economically independent and they should be accounted for when 
measuring inequality.  
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 When using the share of family farms as a measure of equality, there are some caveats. 
The concept of family farms has been kept fixed by Vanhanen (2003b), but it is possible that it 
differs across countries and across time due to differences in technology and geographic 
conditions. The share of family farms is estimated mainly from agricultural censuses provided by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, but other sources were used 
when agricultural holdings were not available from the FAO reports. Furthermore, this indicator 
does not make a distinction between those who accessed the land in different ways, such as 
owner-operator, share tenant or pure tenant. According to theory and empirical evidence, land 
tenure status is an important determinant of the claims to the returns to land cultivation (i.e. 
income). Thus, countries that have a similar share of family farms, could have a different 
composition of tenure status, and this results in a different patterns of income distribution.14  
Other caveat of using the share of family farms as a measure of equality is that it ignores 
the distribution of land that does not fall in this category, such as unutilized land, and does not 
account for landlessness. These two factors are taken into account in this measure only if a 
certain area of unutilized land becomes a family farm and if a landless rural household gets 
access to land in the form of family farm. Therefore, the share of family farms may 
underestimate inequality.  
Furthermore, many LDCs have experienced fast urbanization that has decreased their 
agricultural activity, and it could be argued that the share of family farms is not relevant for the 
distribution of income today. However, the access to land reveals the initial conditions that 
individuals face in the urbanization process. According to Easterly (2007), access to land reflects 
structural inequality that is associated with a certain type of institutions and capital accumulation, 
and these transcend from the rural sector to the urban sector. 
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Although these caveats are relevant, the share of family farms is the only measure of 
inequality that is available consistently through time for a large sample of Latin American 
countries in the period of analysis. While the share of family farms is not a perfect measure of 
inequality, it is the most reasonable proxy of inequality that can be used to test empirically the 
ES hypothesis due to its correlation with factor endowments. Through robustness tests, it is 
expected to diminish some of the problems associated with this measure of inequality.  
 To analyze the effect of inequality on growth, I estimate a version of the augmented 
Solow model: 
 
 =− −1,, )ln()ln( titi YY   tititi schoolYIY ,3,21,10 )ln()/ln()ln( αααα +++ −  (1) 
    titign ,,4 )ln( εδα ++++  
 
 In equation (1), the dependent variable is the period average of the difference of the 
natural log of real GDP per capita (average GDP growth). I control for initial conditions by using 
the average of the natural log of real GDP per capita in the previous period (initial GDP). The 
natural log of investment as a share of GDP (I/Y) and the natural log of schooling (school) are 
included as independent variables. I also include a term that controls for population growth (n), 
technology advancement (g), and depreciation (δ). In this model, n is measured as the growth 
rate of the working age population and g + δ is assumed to be equal to 0.05 (Mankiw et al., 
1992).    
 Since inequality is measured as the area of family farms as a percentage of the total area 
of agricultural holdings, increases in this variable represent increases in equality. Because 
inequality may be correlated with unobservable factors associated with growth, I use the first lag 
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of the family farms share. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) argue that changes in inequality are more 
costly in terms of growth at either very high or very low levels of inequality. Hence, in addition 
to including the linear term of the equality indicator, I also test for the nonlinear effect of 
equality on growth by including the square of the lagged family farms share. This leads to the 
following equation: 
 
               (2) 
   
 In equation (2), Si,t,t-1 represents the variables from the augmented Solow model specified 
in equation (1), Φ(·) is a function that can be estimated with flexibility (linear or quadratic 
specification), and T is a vector of four time dummy variables that account for variation across 
time. The measure of equality is the share of family farms. The variables used in this analysis 
and their sources are described in Table 2; Table 3 shows the summary statistics. 
Table 2 here 
Table 3 here 
    
4. RESULTS 
 Column 1 of Table 4 shows the results of estimating the basic growth model with the 
linear term of inequality (lagged family farms share) using ordinary least squares (OLS).15 In this 
estimation, initial real GDP per capita has a significant negative effect at the 10 percent level, 
which supports the idea of conditional convergence. Investment has a significant positive effect 
at the 1 percent level, which is expected as well. The coefficients for human capital and (n + g + 
δ) are not statistically significant.16 The lagged family farms share is statistically significant at 
itittittititi TEqualitySYY ελ ++Φ+=− −−− )()ln()ln( 1,1,,1,,
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the 5 percent level. Column 1 shows that the effect of the level of family farms on growth is 
small since an increase of the share of family farms by one standard deviation (10.25) increases 
growth by 0.31 percent. Column 2 shows the results of adding the square of the lagged family 
farms share. I find that the level and the square of family farms share are statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. These estimates support the argument that inequality has a nonlinear effect 
on growth.  
Table 4 here 
 Using the coefficients from column 2 of Table 4, Figure 1 shows how economic growth 
varies with changes in the family farms share. The effect of the family farms share on growth is 
increasing up to the point where the family farms share is equal to 50 percent. After the share of 
family farms reaches 50 percent, any further increase in family farms have a decreasing effect on 
growth. This result supports Banerjee and Duflo’s (2003) finding that growth is hampered at 
very high and very low levels of inequality. 
Figure 1 here 
 Figure 1 shows an inverse U shaped relationship between equality and growth and this 
finding is relevant for policymakers in Latin America. The latest available observations for the 
share of family farms (shown in Table 5) show that all countries in the sample would benefit by 
an increase in the family farms share. The sample mean of the share of family farms is 26 and all 
the countries have current family farm shares in the left hand side of the curve in Figure 1. 
Figure 2 shows a close up of the effect of increases of the share of family farms up to the point 
where the effect of an increase on the share of family farms on growth is increasing (50 percent). 
The countries with the lowest family farms share are Honduras, Paraguay, Venezuela, and 
Panama (with family farm shares below 20 percent), and those with the highest family farms 
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share are Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and El Salvador (with family farm shares 
between 32 and 36 percent).   
Table 5 here 
Figure 2 here 
It is important to note that the right hand side of the curve shown in Figure 1 was 
constructed as an extrapolation, since no observation on the share of family farms above 54 
percent (maximum observed during the sample period) was available. While the shape of the 
curve is likely to have this form based on other theoretical and empirical analyses, we should 
refer to the right hand side of the curve with caution. A possible explanation of why it is likely 
that as the share of family farms increases above 50 percent, the effect of equality on growth is 
diminishing, is that countries with a high share of family farms will be more likely to adopt 
protectionist policies with the purpose to increase farm income.  
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
(a) Adding other control variables 
To determine whether previous results are robust, it is necessary to show that the 
nonlinear effect of inequality on growth is not picking up the effect of other variables. For this 
reason, I use different model specifications that include other variables that are commonly used 
in the analysis of inequality and growth (share of government spending and polity growth), 
account for specific country conditions (urbanization), and could be correlated with the share of 
family farms (rural spending, technology, and geography). 
In Table 4, columns 3 and 4 show the estimates obtained when two other variables 
commonly used in analyses of the effect of inequality on growth are added. Column 3 shows that 
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the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth is significant when controlling for government 
expenditure (measured as the natural log of government consumption as percentage of real 
GDP). I find that, although the coefficient of the natural log of government consumption share 
has a significant negative effect at the 1 percent level, the family farms share still has a 
significant nonlinear effect on growth. Political regime type has been also considered as an 
important determinant of growth. Following Perotti (1996) and Barro (2000), I add the growth 
rate of the period average of the polity score to the growth equation to account for changes on the 
political regime. The polity score is the combined score of the democracy and autocracy scores 
and goes from -10 to 10, where 10 is assigned to high democracies and -10 to high autocracies. 
Estimates in column 4 show that the growth of the polity score has a significant positive effect at 
the 1 percent level, and inequality has a significant nonlinear effect on economic growth. It is 
important to note that the coefficients’ magnitude and significance on the level and square of the 
lagged family farms share are very similar when these control variables are added (columns 2 to 
4).17   
 It is also necessary to determine whether the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth is 
relevant for Latin American countries after controlling for urbanization. It could be argued that 
results may be driven by certain countries that are less urbanized, and that the share of family 
farms has no impact on growth in highly urbanized countries. Therefore, I include in the growth 
equation the first lag of a dummy variable that is equal to one if a country has a period average of 
urban population as a percentage of total population equal or greater than 50 percent and an 
interaction term of the first lag of the share of family farms and this urban dummy. Table 5 
shows the decade in which a country had for the first time an average of urban population share 
of 50 percent or above. The countries that started the period of analysis with a urban population 
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share higher or equal to 50 percent were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. In Table 4, column 5 shows that the nonlinear effect of equality on growth 
persists and, while the urban dummy has a significant negative effect at the 1 percent level, the 
interaction term has a significant positive effect at the 1 percent level, meaning that highly 
urbanized countries benefit the most with larger family farm shares in the previous period. 
Without taking into consideration the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth, an increase of the 
family farms share by one standard deviation in highly urbanized countries in the previous period 
causes an increase on growth of 1 percent.   
Additionally, to determine the impact of inequality on growth when controlling for 
urbanization, I estimate the growth equation with inequality only for the sample mentioned 
above (countries that reached urban population share higher or equal to 50 percent in 1960). 
Interestingly, I find that while the nonlinear effect does not hold for this sample, an increase on 
the share of family farms has a positive significant effect on GDP growth (Table 4, column 6). 
To determine the robustness of the effect inequality on growth, it is also important to 
control for factors that may be correlated with the family farms share and that they may have a 
significant effect on growth. Since distribution of land may be correlated to government 
spending on agriculture, it is important to account for that. Anriquez (2006) shows that the 
composition of rural spending, where there is a distinction between private transfers (mostly 
subsidies) and public investment (roads, electricity, schools, etc…), has an impact on agricultural 
output. He finds that those countries with higher spending on public goods have higher rural 
income. Lopez (2003, 2005) supports this finding. Since countries with high inequality tend to 
observe more spending on private transfers, the family farms share variable may be picking up 
not only the effect of inequality on growth, but also the effect of the composition of government 
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spending on agriculture. For this reason, following Anriquez (2006) methodology, I include in 
the regression two variables that account for private and public rural spending. These variables 
are constructed as the average of private and public rural spending for the available observations 
between 1985 and 2001, using data from GPRural (FAO, 2005). Estimates adding these two 
variables are shown in Column 1 of Table 6. Both variables, while having a coefficient sign 
different than the one expected, have no significant effect. In this estimation, the linear and 
square terms of the lagged share of family farms are significant at the 1 and 10 percent level 
respectively. 
Table 6 here 
To account for technology in the agricultural sector, irrigated land as a percentage of 
cropland (irrigated land) and the natural log of the number of tractors per 100 squared kilometers 
of arable land (agricultural machines) are added as controls variables, one at the time. Estimates 
in Columns 2 and 3 (Table 6) show that inequality has a significant nonlinear effect on growth at 
the 5 percent level when these control variables are added. While irrigated land does not have a 
significant effect, the variable of agricultural machines has a significant positive effect at the 10 
percent level. It can also be argued that because inequality is highly correlated to factor 
endowments (ES hypothesis), the effect of the family farms share on growth may just reflect the 
effect of geography. Hence, I include in the estimation as control variable the natural log of the 
percentage of land area in the geographical tropics. While this indicator has a significant 
negative effect on growth at the 5 percent level, inequality has a significant nonlinear effect on 
growth at the 1 percent level. 
To sum up, previous results have shown that the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth 
is robust to different model specifications that control for different factors. It is also important to 
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note that for the sample included in the analysis, an increase on equality (i.e. increase on the 
share of family farms) has an increasing effect on growth. Based on the latest observation of the 
family farms share, an increase in the share of family farms will be beneficial in terms of 
economic growth for the countries in this analysis.18 
 
(b) Using another measure of inequality 
Since the share of family farms represents a proxy of inequality that is related to the 
distribution of land, it is necessary to determine if previous results are robust to using a different 
measure of inequality. To do this, the land Gini coefficient constructed by Frankema (2008) is 
useful. Frankema’s (2008) land Gini is a good indicator of the access to land as a factor of 
production since it is constructed by looking at land holdings, where land holdings refers to 
disposable amount per farm. This indicator is not available for all countries in the sample 
consistently over time, but it is available for 16 countries either in 1950 and 1960.19 In fact, the 
initial land Gini coefficient and the share of family farms 1968 have a significant correlation 
equal to -0.69. Estimates using the land Gini coefficient as an indicator of inequality show the 
land Gini coefficient has a significant negative effect on growth at the 5 percent level (Table 6, 
Column 5). While the non linear effect does not hold when using this indicator, the previous 
finding that equality has an increasing effect on growth for the countries in the sample holds.20 
These estimates show that if the land Gini decreases by one standard deviation (5.15), economic 
growth increases by 0.26 percent, which is similar to the effect found when including only the 
linear term of family farms (Table 4, column 1).21   
 
(c) Controlling for the endogeneity of inequality 
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In the previous estimations, which are all OLS with robust standard error, it was intended 
to address for endogeneity by using the lagged family farms share. However, it could be argued 
that because the share of family farms is estimated later on the decade, this variable still 
endogenous in Equation 2 since it may be correlated to the error term. The endogeneity of 
inequality in the growth equation can be due not only to simultaneity, but also to omitted 
variable and measurement error biases. For this reason, it is important to determine whether 
previous results are robust to controlling for endogeneity. To address for endogeneity, I use the 
General Method of Moments (GMM) and Arellano and Bond (AB) estimators.22 In this part of 
the analysis, I focus on testing whether the share of family farms has a robust significant positive 
linear effect on growth. I do not consider testing the nonlinear effect due to the difficulty of 
instrumenting for it. 
When instrumenting for inequality, it is necessary to find a variable that is partially 
correlated with the share of family farms but uncorrelated with the error term in the growth 
equation. Easterly (2007) suggests using an indicator related to factor endowments as an 
instrument of inequality. Based on the ES hypothesis, he constructed the wheat-sugar ratio, 
which represents the ratio of the share of arable land suitable for wheat and the share of arable 
land suitable for sugar cane. Easterly (2007) shows that wheat-sugar ratio is significantly 
correlated with the share of family farms. In this analysis, the wheat-sugar ratio has a positive 
significant effect on the share of family farms in late 1950s, which goes according with 
Easterly’s (2007) findings.23 In order to be able to identify the equation and test whether the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, it is necessary to have at least two instruments 
for inequality. For this reason I use the second lag of the share of family farms as an additional 
instrument. For the GMM estimation, I also address for the endogeneity of investment by using 
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the lagged investment share as instrument. 
For the GMM estimaton, all variables are estimated using the set of instruments in the 
first stage, where this set includes all exogenous variables in the growth equation (including the 
time dummy variables) and three additional instruments (wheat-sugar ratio, the second lag of the 
share of family farms, and the first lag of the investment share). Then, the fitted values from the 
first stage regressions are used to estimate the growth equation with inequality in the second 
stage. Estimates in Table 7, column 1 show that the lagged share of family farms has a 
significant positive effect at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, according to the overidentifying 
restrictions test shown in column 1 (J-test), I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid even at the 10 percent level.24 
Table 7 here 
Since the measure of inequality varies over time in this analysis, an instrument that varies 
over time could is preferable. For this reason, following Easterly’s (2007) approach, I construct a 
factor endowment indicator that varies over time. The yield obtained per hectare of certain crops 
accounts for the suitability of land and can vary over time. Therefore, I estimate the average 
period of the yield of sugarcane in every country for which there was available data for the 
period of analysis and calculate the natural log of the inverse of this yield.25 While a better 
instrument will also account for the yield of wheat per hectare, many countries missed data on 
this variable, and that is why only the yield of sugarcane was taken into consideration. I also find 
that the sugar yield ratio has a positive significant effect on the share of family farms in late 
1950s. When the sugar yield ratio is used as an additional instrument (instead of Easterly’s 
wheat-sugar ratio and in addition to the second lag of the share of family farms), estimates in 
column 2 (Table 7) show that the share of family farms has also a positive significant effect on 
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economic growth.  For this estimation, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid even at the 15 percent level.26 
  The AB estimator can also be used to address for endogeneity. For the AB estimator, I 
include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side is included and first difference the 
growth model with the linear term of inequality to eliminate individual effects.27 The AB uses 
lagged levels of the variables as instruments, where lagged levels of inequality instrument for the 
difference of inequality.28 Using the two-step AB estimator and including time dummies, 
estimates show that the share of family farms has also a positive significant effect on economic 
growth at the 5 percent level (Table 7, column 3). For this estimation, I also cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid even at the 15 percent level.29 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 The results obtained in this empirical analysis are relevant for the analysis of the effect of 
inequality on growth and for policymakers in Latin America. This analysis benefits significantly 
from using a measure of inequality that is observable through time for a large sample of Latin 
American countries. The empirical results show a robust nonlinear effect of inequality on growth 
in Latin America. From this analysis, it can be concluded that countries in Latin America could 
benefit from more equality up to a certain level. After equality reaches this level, the effect of 
increases in equality on growth will be decreasing. Based on current values of the measure of 
inequality used, the family farms share, I find that all countries would benefit with increases in 
the share of family farms. The positive effect of the share of family farms was robust to several 
model specifications (different control variables), using a different measure of inequality (land 
Gini) and addressing for endogeneity (GMM and AB estimators).  
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 A possible explanation of the positive effect of the share of family farms on economic 
growth is the inverse farm size productivity relationship. It has been posited that one of the 
advantages of a more equal distribution of land is that farms that are primarily operated with 
family labor tend to be more productive on average. Vollrath (2007) shows that the land Gini has 
a significant negative effect on agricultural productivity. Thus, it can be argued that one of the 
channels through which the share of family farms affects economic growth positively in Latin 
America is through its effect on productivity.30   
  Since an increase in the percentage of family farms seems to be beneficial in Latin 
America, programs that promote agricultural activity on a small scale, such as the creation of 
microfinancing and support institutions, could benefit the region significantly. A more developed 
financial system, in which individuals have greater access to private credit could also promote an 
increase in the percentage of family farms. In fact, credit markets play a central role on the 
expansions of agricultural activity at a small scale since the poor lack the capital required for this 
type of activity. Access to credit through microcredit can help to sustain the existing family 
farms, but also increase the number of individuals that can have access to land. In addition, 
programs that allow farmers to insure themselves against natural disasters or bad weather 
conditions could also promote more equality in Latin America. These programs can significantly 
help to avoid poverty traps in agricultural areas. 
 Land reform that focus on improving the efficiency of land markets may be required in 
order to make access to land more equitable in Latin America. Since land rights are “social 
conventions that regulate the distribution of the benefits that accrue from specific uses of a 
certain piece of land”, stronger property rights are necessary in order to promote not only more 
investment on agriculture, but also more exchanges (Deininger, 2004, p.4). With stronger 
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property rights, transfer of land use rights from the less productive to the more productive 
individuals will take place more often and at lower transaction costs (Deininger, 2003). It is 
important to emphasize that even tough Latin American countries share some common 
characteristics, the programs to improve the efficiency of land markets may be country-specific. 
      
                                                 
1 See Table 1 for an explanation of how this average was estimated and the source of the data.  
2 See De Ferranti et al. (2004) for a comprehensive study of inequality in Latin America. 
3 Replicating his estimation in a sample restricted to 20 Latin American countries, I find similar 
results. I use the average of the Gini coefficients from 1960 to 2000 provided by the World 
Institute of Development and Economics Research (WIDER, 2007) and Easterly’s (2007) 
instrument for income inequality in a cross-sectional framework. I find that income inequality 
has a negative effect on growth and the percentage of secondary enrollment. These estimations 
are not included for reasons of space, but the results are available upon request. 
4 If a minimal criterion was specified for the Gini coefficient of income distribution, only 6 of the 
18 Latin American countries included in this analysis would have observations from 1960 to 
2000 (minimal criteria for Gini coefficient: sample covers the whole population and area of the 
country, the income share unit is the household or family, and it is estimated based on the 
income concept, where the income concept could be different across countries and across time). 
Gini coefficients of land distribution for Latin American countries are not available consistently 
over time.  
5 I use equality and inequality interchangeable along the paper since the main indicator used in 
this analysis is a measure of equality (share of family farms). 
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6 Vanhanen (2003a) makes this argument and presents empirical evidence supporting this. In 
theory, this argument to Latin American countries. However, there are exceptions, since there are 
some societies in which access to land have not led to participation in the political process and 
access to education (e.g. China). 
7 Benabou (1996) presents a review of the theoretical models that explain the negative effects of 
inequality on growth and a table with the results of a large number of empirical analyses. 
Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) present a figure showing all the different channels through 
which inequality affects growth negatively. Birdsall (2007) reviews the negative effects of 
inequality on growth in LDCs. 
8 Fields (2001) presents a review on the Kuznets hypothesis and on empirical analyses that test 
this hypothesis.  
9 See Deininger and Squire (1996) for an explanation on these measurement issues. 
10 Panizza (2002) also shows empirically that the effect of inequality on growth in the United 
States varies depending on the method used to measure inequality.  
11 See Easterly (2007), Hoff (2003), and Levine (2005) for a good review on the theoretical and 
empirical work on this hypothesis. 
12 Przeworski and Curvale (2008) show, in a sample that includes 15 Latin American countries, 
Canada, and the United States, that there is a negative correlation between the family farms share 
and the income Gini coefficient.   
13 Some have found that income inequality has deterred the accumulation of physical and human 
capital in the region (Grier, 2002; De Gregorio and Lee, 2004; Motiram and Nugent, 2007). 
Others argue that education is unequally distributed in Latin America, and this has contributed to 
the perpetuation of high levels of inequality (Altimir, 1997; Frankema and Bolt, 2006). 
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14 Hayami and Otsuka (1993) present an overview of the different types of contracts for agrarian 
activities (fixed or shared rent) and how do they vary across countries. 
15 All estimations are OLS with White’s standard errors and period fixed effects, unless specified 
otherwise.  
16 Schooling becomes statistically significant with a positive sign in other estimations. 
17 The size and significance of the coefficients on the level and square of lagged family farms 
share do not change if I include in the growth equation the natural log of the government share 
and the polity growth at the same time. Results were not included for reasons of space. 
18 Tables 1 and 2 present a detailed description of how these control variables were estimated and 
their sources and their summary statistics. When only the linear term of the share of family farms 
is included and all these control variables are added one at the time, I found that the share of 
family farms has a significant positive effect on economic growth in most of the cases (6 out of 
8) at the 5 percent level. The linear effect of the share of family farms is insignificant when 
private and public rural spending are added, but private and rural spending are insignificant (F 
test shows that these two variables do not add to the model). When the share of land in the 
tropics is added, the linear term of the share of family farms has a positive significant effect at 
the 10 percent level. Estimates not included for purpose of space. 
19 Only for Ecuador and Honduras, it is needed to use observations in 1950 since observations in 
1960 are not available. Frankema’s (2008) land gini coefficient is not available for Mexico and 
Bolivia. 
20 Estimates including the linear and squared land Gini coefficient show no significant effect and 
are not included for purpose of space.  
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21 The statistically negative significant effect of the land Gini is robust to the inclusion of other 
control variables at the 5 percent level in most cases.  
22 Estimates obtained use White’s robust standard errors and period fixed effects. 
23 This finding was obtained when the share of family farms is regressed on the wheat-sugar ratio 
including time dummy variables and using White’s robust standard errors. 
24 The critical value for this test is 2.71 at the 10 percent level with 1 degree of freedom. 
25 I use data from ProdSTAT (FAOSTAT, 2008) to estimate the sugar yield ratio. Data is 
available for all countries but Chile 
26 The critical value for this test is 3.84 at the 15 percent level with 1 degree of freedom. 
27 Time dummies are also included in the AB estimation. 
28 Refer to Arellano and Bond (1991) and Baltagi (1995) for further explanation on the AB 
estimator.  
29 The critical value for this test is 13.30 at the 15 percent level with 9 degrees of freedom. 
30 Using Vollrath’s (2007) model, where agricultural output per hectare is regressed on the share 
of family farms and other control variables, I find that the share of family farms has a positive 
significant effect on agricultural productivity. Results not included for purpose of space but are 
available upon request. 
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Table 1. Average Gini Coefficients and Income Share of Lowest and Highest Deciles a  
(2000 – 2005) 
       
  
Gini  
Coefficient  
Income share 
of lowest 10th 
Income share 
of highest 10th 
Bolivia 61.69 0.25 48.01 
Brazil 58.51 0.90 46.84 
Chile 56.42 1.21 46.66 
Colombia 56.95 0.75 45.36 
Costa Rica 48.76 1.30 37.18 
Dom. Republic 51.09 1.36 40.19 
Ecuador 56.02 1.03 45.34 
El Salvador 51.68 0.78 38.63 
Guatemala 54.12 1.03 42.70 
Honduras 54.35 0.96 41.82 
Mexico 52.36 1.19 41.19 
Nicaragua 54.42 1.22 44.10 
Panama 56.32 0.73 43.16 
Paraguay 56.86 0.77 44.76 
Peru 51.69 1.17 40.61 
Venezuela 45.91 1.46 34.22 
Latin American  
sample average 54.20 1.01 42.55 
    
United States 44.36 1.80 29.47 
Canada 33.01 2.71 24.75 
United Kingdom 27.6 4.0 22.0 
France 34.1 2.4 25.2 
Italy 33.6 2.9 26.5 
Developed countries 
sample average 34.53 2.76 25.58 
    
a Averages are obtained from available observations that meet the three 
criteria: coverage is the whole population and area, the income share unit 
of analysis is the household , and the definition is based on the income 
concept. Argentina and Uruguay are not included in this table since the 
gini coefficients available did not meet these criteria. Gini calculated using 
the methods developed by Shorrocks and Hua Wan, which estimate the 
Gini coefficient from decile data almost as accurately as if unit record data 
were used. Source: World Income Inequality Database (WIDER, 2007). 
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Table 2. Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
 
Economic growth 
(Average GDP growth) 
 
Period average of the difference of the natural log of real GDP per 
capita (constant prices: Laspeyres). Source: Penn World Tables 
6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).  
 
Real GDP (Y) Period average of the natural log of real GDP per capita (constant 
prices: Laspeyres). Source: Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 
2006).  
 
Investment share 
(I/Y) 
Period average of investment share of real GDP (constant prices: 
Laspeyres). Source: Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).  
 
Population growth 
(n) 
Period average of the growth rate of the working age population 
(15 to 64). Source: World Development Indicators (2008).   
 
Technological growth 
and depreciation (g + δ) 
 
Technological growth is represented by g and depreciation by δ.   
g + δ is equal to 0.05. Source: Mankiw et al. (1992). 
 
School Attainment  
(school) 
Years of schooling of population (who is not studying) between 15 
and 64 years old. (10 year frequency). Source: Cohen and Soto 
(2007). 
 
Family farms share 
(equality) 
The area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of 
holdings (10 year frequency). Source: Vanhanen (2003b). 
 
Land gini 
(inequality) 
Gini coefficient of land distribution in 1950 or 1960 (time 
invariant, use observation in 1950 if there is no observation 
available in 1960). Source: Frankema (2008). 
 
Government share  
(G/Y) 
 
Period average of the government share of real GDP (constant 
prices: Laspeyres). Source: Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 
2006). 
 
Polity growth 
 
Growth of the period average of the combined polity score 
(polity2) computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the 
democracy score. Source: Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2003). 
 
Urban dummy Dummy equal to 1 if a country has a period average of the 
percentage of the population that lives in urban areas of 50 percent 
or above. Source: World Development Indicators (2007).   
 
Private and public rural 
spending 
Average of the available observations between 1985 and 2001 of 
private and public rural spending in 1995 U.S. dollars (time 
invariant). Source: GPRural (FAO, 2005) 
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Table 2. Description of Variables (Continued) a 
 
Variable Description 
 
Irrigated land 
 
Period average of irrigated land as a percentage of cropland. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2007). 
 
Agricultural machines Period average of the natural log of agricultural machinery 
(tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land). Source: World 
Development Indicators (2007). 
 
Land tropics Natural log of the percentage of land area in the geographical 
tropics (time invariant). Source: Gallup et al. (1999) 
 
Wheat-sugar ratio  
(instrument) 
Ratio of the suitability of land for wheat and sugarcane. Equal to 
ln[(1+arable land suitable for wheat)/(1+arable land suitable for 
sugar cane)] (time invariant). Source: Easterly (2007)  
 
Sugarcane yield ratio 
(instrument) 
 
The natural log of the inverse of the period average yield of 
sugarcane in hectogram per hectare. Source: ProdSTAT (FAO, 
2008)  
 
a All variables are estimated as the 10 year average from 1960 to 1999 and as the 5 year 
average from 2000 to 2004, unless stated otherwise. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics (1960 – 2004) a 
          
   Mean  Med.  Std. Dev.  Obs.
GDP growth  0.013 0.013 0.019 90
Ln(Y) 8.494 8.501 0.438 90
Ln(I/Y) 2.531 2.514 0.398 90
ln(n + g + δ) -2.591 -2.564 0.109 90
ln(school) 1.621 1.667 0.394 90
Family farms share t-1 23.333 23.000 10.249 90
Land gini 79.006 78.900 5.151 80
ln(G/Y) 2.894 2.876 0.280 90
Polity growth -0.656 -0.028 2.131 90
Urban dummy 0.656 1.000 0.478 90
Private rural spending 177468.3 100851.4 231904.9 80
Public rural spending 288829.0 158239.1 349361.3 80
Irrigated land t 12.518 5.808 13.684 90
Agricultural machines t 4.037 4.061 0.961 90
Land tropics 0.226 0.177 0.187 90
ln(wheat-sugar ratio) -0.031 -0.096 0.205 90
ln(1/sugar yield) -13.327 -13.338 0.328 85
a Observations for the family farms share are from 1958 to 1998. 
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Table 4. OLS Estimates (dependent variable: average GDP growth) a 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  
Constant 0.062  0.057  0.087* 0.068  0.041  0.041  
 (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.071)  (0.052)  
ln(Y) t-1 -0.010* -0.009* -0.010* -0.009  -0.009  -0.020***
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
ln(I/Y) t 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.029***
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  
ln(n + g + δ) t 0.008  0.012  0.012  0.015  0.004  -0.020  
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.024)  
ln(school) t 0.005  0.006* 0.008*** 0.006** 0.002  0.005  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.010)  
Family farms t-1 0.0003** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.0003***
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0005)  (0.0001)  
Family farms2t-1   -0.00001*** -0.00002*** -0.00001*** -0.00002***   
   (0.000004)  (0.000004)  (0.000004)  (0.00001)    
ln(G/Y) t     -0.010***       
     (0.004)        
Polity growth t       0.001***     
       (0.0001)      
Urban dummy t-1         -0.027***   
         (0.005)    
Urban dummy t-1 * 
family farmst-1         0.001***   
         (0.0002)    
             
R-squared 0.490  0.496  0.515  0.504  0.550  0.705  
Observations 90   90   90   90   72   35   
a White’s robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. 
Estimations include time dummies but coefficients are not shown for space purposes. 
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Table 5. Resource Inequality and Urbanization in Latin America a 
      
  
FF 
 rank 
Family 
farms share 
(1968) 
Land 
Gini 
rank 
Land Gini 
coefficient 
(1960) 
FF 
 rank 
Family 
farms share  
(1998) 
Average urban 
population rate 
reached 50 %  
Argentina 10 22 5 81.4 6 22 1960 
Bolivia  20   13 31 1980 
Brazil 7 18 9 78.7 5 20 1970 
Chile 2 7 1 86.5 7 23 1960 
Colombia 8 20 6 80.5 14 32 1960 
Costa Rica 13 27 14 73.9 16 33 1990 
Dom. Rep. 11 24 13 74.5 12 30 1980 
Ecuador 12 25 7 80.4 17 36 1980 
El Salvador 16 34 10 78.3 18 36 1990 
Guatemala 14 29 11 77 11 29 - - 
Honduras 15 30 15 70.6 1 13 - - 
Mexico  43   15 32 1960 
Nicaragua 5 17 12 75.9 9 25 1980 
Panama 6 17 16 69.9 4 18 1980 
Paraguay 3 7 2 86.3 2 15 1990 
Peru 4 8 4 85.4 8 24 1960 
Uruguay 9 21 8 79.1 10 27 1960 
Venezuela 1 5 3 85.7 3 15 1960 
        
Mean   19.44  79.01  25.61 59.34 
Median  20.50  78.90  26 57.93 
Std. Dev.  8.93  5.29  7.32 17.15 
Maximum   34.00  86.50  36 92.02 
Minimum  5.00  69.90  13 25.44 
a The ranking for the share of family farms in 1968 does not include Bolivia and Mexico with the 
purpose to make it comparable to the ranking obtained from the land gini coefficient. Land gini 
coefficients are those estimated by Frankema (2008) in any year of 1960 for all countries but 
Ecuador and Honduras. The land Ginis for Ecuador and Honduras are those available in 1950. The 
ranking goes from 1 to 18, where 1 is the most unequal (highest land Gini and lowest family farms 
share) and 18 the most equal (lowest land Gini and highest family farm share). Guatemala and 
Honduras did not reach 50 percent of urban population by the period between 2000 and 2004. 
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Table 6. OLS Estimates (dependent variables: average GDP growth) a 
  1  2  3  4  5  
Constant 0.059  0.060  0.093* 0.086* 0.100  
 (0.064)  (0.048)  (0.054)  (0.047)  (0.061)  
ln(Y) t-1 -0.010  -0.009* -0.015** -0.008  -0.012* 
 (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
ln(I/Y) t 0.013*** 0.013** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
ln(n + g + δ) t 0.006  0.010  0.011  0.026** -0.001  
 (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.018)  
ln(school) t 0.007** 0.004  0.002  0.006** 0.009** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Family farms t-1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***   
 (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)    
Family farms2t-1 -0.00001* -0.00001** -0.00001** -0.00001***   
 (0.000005)  (0.000004)  (0.000004)  (0.000004)    
Private rural spending 0.00000001          
 (0.00000001)          
Public rural spending -0.000000003          
 (0.00000001)          
Irrigated land t   0.0002        
   (0.0001)        
ln(Agricultural machines) t     0.005*     
     (0.003)      
ln(Land tropics)       -0.014**   
       (0.006)    
Land gini         -0.0005** 
         (0.0002)  
R-squared 0.494  0.507  0.532  0.508  0.466   
a White’s robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. All 
estimations have 90 observations. Only the estimations in columns 1 and 5 have 80 observations due to data unavailability. 
Estimations include time dummies but coefficients are not shown for space purposes. 
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Table 7. GMM and AB Estimates (dependent variable: average GDP growth) a 
 
  1  2   3   
Constant 0.102*** 0.095***   
 (0.038)  (0.037)    
ln(Y) t-1 -0.011*** -0.010** -0.050 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  
ln(I/Y) t 0.004  0.006  0.025 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  
ln(n + g + δ) t 0.007  0.006  0.043 * 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.022)  
ln(school) t 0.010*** 0.007** -0.027 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)  
Family farms t-1 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.001 ** 
 (0.00003)  (0.00005)  (0.0003)  
Avg. GDP growth t-1   -0.369 *** 
   (0.067)  
     
Observations 90  85  72  
     
J-test 2.599  0.919  8.160  
J-test probability 0.108   0.338   0.418   
a White’s robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, represent 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent respectively. All variables in 
column 3 are first differences. Estimations include time dummies but 
coefficients are not shown for space purposes. 
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Figure 1. Nonlinear Effect of Family Farms Share on Growth (Range 1 to 100) 
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Figure 2. Nonlinear Effect of Family Farms Share on Growth (Range 1 to 50) 
 
